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SAME GRID, DIFFERENT RESULTS:
CRIMINAL SENTENCING DISPARITIES
BETWEEN ARKANSAS COUNTIES 
Alexis Stevens 
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Prosecutorial Discretion at Play
Abraham Davis is a resident of Fort Smith, Arkansas—and 
a convicted felon.1  In May of 2017, the Sebastian County Circuit 
Court, Fort Smith District, charged Davis with criminal mischief 
in the first degree, as a Class D felony, for purposely destroying 
the property of another.2  Davis’s charge resulted in a criminal 
sentence ranging from as little as probation to as much as 6 years 
jail time and/or up to $10,000.00 in fines.3  This sentencing deter-
mination is generally allocated to the judge and prosecutor.4  
However, victim intervention persuaded the court to release Da-
vis on probation,5 sparing him from a much harsher sentence.  
Were it not for victim interference, the court stated, it “would not 
have done [probation] . . . .  [Davis] would have gone to trial, and 
there is a good chance [he] would have gone to prison.”6 
Davis’s story began in October of 2016 when he agreed to 
drive a friend to a local mosque.7  His friend vandalized the build-
ing, leaving swastikas and a litany of curses plastered across the 
mosque’s windows and doors.8  Meanwhile, Davis “stood watch 
1. Sentencing Order at 1, Arkansas v. Davis, No. 17-1731 (Ark. 12th Cir. May 26,
2017), CR-2017-267-A [hereinafter Davis Sentencing Order]. 
2. Id.  See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-203 (2013).
3. See Davis Sentencing Order, supra note 1, at 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5)
(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-201(a)(2) (2009). 
4. See discussion infra Section I.B.
5. Davis Sentencing Order, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Sabrina Tavernise, The Two Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/Q3ZN-ZA9N]. 
7. Id.
8. Id.
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in the driveway.”9  Time passed, but Davis’s regret did not.  About 
four months later, the police attempted to execute an arrest war-
rant at Davis’s house for his involvement in the vandalization.10  
Davis was not present when the police arrived, however, he 
turned himself in as soon as he received notification of their 
visit.11  Without $1,580.00 to pay for bail, Davis became the third 
person crammed into a small, two-man cell at the Sebastian 
County Detention Center.12  Five days in, a guard handed out let-
ter materials to the detainees.13  Davis took the paper and started 
to write.14  “Dear Masjid Al Salam Mosque,” he began.15 
In his letter, Davis expressed regret for his actions, taking 
full responsibility for what he had done.16  He did not ask for the 
mosque’s forgiveness or its sympathy, but rather wrote the letter 
solely to apologize for the vandalism.17  Dr. Louay Nassri, the 
president of Al Salam Mosque, was “moved” by Davis’s words 
and conduct.18  After conferring with the mosque’s senior mem-
bers, Dr. Nassri met with the prosecutor’s office.19  During the 
meeting, “he made clear that the mosque did not want to press 
charges and strongly opposed a felony charge for [Davis].”20  
“We did not want this to destroy his life,” Dr. Nassri later said.21 
The members of Al Salam Mosque persistently attempted to 
help Davis and mitigate his punishment.  In a second meeting with 
Dr. Nassri, prosecutors explained that Davis would have to plead 
guilty to a felony or go to trial.22  But at trial, he would likely 
receive a harsher sentence.23  By accepting the plea, Davis “would 
avoid prison, but only if he remained on good behavior for three 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Tavernise, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Tavernise, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Tavernise, supra note 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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years.”24  However, Davis would also become a convicted felon, 
and “[a]ny minor violation” would send him to prison for six 
years.25  In an attempt to reduce Davis’s property damage charge 
from a felony to a misdemeanor, Dr. Nassri submitted paperwork 
showing cleanup costs of only $500.00.26  The prosecutor’s of-
fice, however, opted for their own estimate of $1,800.00 which 
maintained Davis’s felony charge.27 
Despite the victims’ strong opposition to a felony charge, 
prosecutors maintained that “actions had consequences and that 
[Davis] had participated.”28  During Davis’s May 24th hearing, 
prosecutors noted the victims’ requests for “mercy and leni-
ency.”29  Although, the judge accepted the victims’ pleas, he re-
buked the defendants: 
If the victims in this case had not approved of this, I would 
not have done it[.] . . .  You would have gone to trial, and 
there is a good chance all three of you would have gone to 
prison.  So you need to think twice before you do something, 
which is just stupid.  What you did was just stupid.30 
Davis is now a convicted felon—a small price to pay for what 
could have happened.  Had the victims of Davis’s crime not in-
tervened, then what?  If Davis were solely at the mercy of the 
county prosecutors, judges, and jury, he would likely be joining 
the roughly 26,000 other people sitting in Arkansas’s jail and 
prison cells at this very moment.31  Among him would be many 
other non-violent offenders who are becoming a part of Arkan-
sas’s much larger issue: sentencing disparities. 
Despite state-wide uniform sentencing guidelines, non-vio-
lent drug offenders in Arkansas counties are frequently given sig-
nificantly disparate sentences depending on offender location.  
This Comment contends that Arkansas should create a commis-
sion to review prosecutor conduct to ensure more uniform 
24. Id.  See also Davis Sentencing Order, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
25. Tavernise, supra note 6.
26. See Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Tavernise, supra note 6.
31. Arkansas Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, [https://perma.cc/FA8L-DMH6] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
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sentencing.  Part I explains how criminal sentencing works in Ar-
kansas and describes the role of prosecutorial discretion.  Through 
an empirical study, Part II illustrates the existing problem of dis-
parate, non-violent drug offender punishments by comparing sen-
tences in nearby Arkansas counties.  Part III then argues that im-
plementation of a commission to review prosecutorial conduct 
would provide the requisite oversight to ensure more uniform sen-
tencing for criminal defendants and also analyzes one such com-
mission. 
B. How Arkansas Criminal Sentencing Works
In 1993, identical Acts 532 and 550 of 1993 (the Acts) cre-
ated the Arkansas Sentencing Commission to oversee numerous 
facets of criminal sentencing and to promulgate sentencing guide-
lines for the courts.32  The Arkansas Sentencing Commission’s 
stated purpose “is to establish sentencing standards and to moni-
tor and assess the impact of practices, policies, and existing laws 
on the correctional resources of the state.”33  The Acts addition-
ally authorized the creation of the Arkansas Sentencing Standards 
Grid (Sentencing Standards Grid) and Seriousness Rankings.34  
Four statutes, sections 16-90-801 to -804 of the Arkansas Code, 
codified the Acts into law.35 
The Sentencing Standards Grid is intended for use by prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, judges, or anyone “directly involved in 
sentencing”; however, its guidelines are not binding on sentenc-
ing courts.36  The Sentencing Standards Grid’s purpose is to pro-
vide punishments that are proportional to both the seriousness of 
the underlying offense and the offender’s criminal history, thus 
ensuring equitable sentencing statewide.37  Beginning January 1, 
32. See H.B. 1465, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1993); S.B. 363, 79th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1993). 
33. Mission Statement, ARK. SENTENCING COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/F549-HE49]
(last visited Oct. 31, 2019). 
34. See Ark. H.B. 1465; Ark. S.B. 363; see also infra Appendix A: Revised Arkansas
Sentencing Standards Grid. 
35. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801 to -804 (2019).
36. ARK. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING STANDARDS GRID OFFENSE 
SERIOUSNESS RANKINGS AND RELATED MATERIAL 1 (2018), [https://perma.cc/68LA-
V68T] [hereinafter ASC, 2018 BENCHBOOK]. 
37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801(b).
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1994, the appropriate cell of the Sentencing Standards Grid deter-
mines the “presumptive sentence” for any felony offender.38  The 
two axes of the Sentencing Standards Grid represent the primary 
factors of a criminal sentence: “offense seriousness and offender 
history.”39   
In reaching an offender’s punishment, the court first deter-
mines the presumptive sentence using offense seriousness and of-
fender history.  The vertical axis represents offense seriousness, 
which is determined by the following criteria: (1) the offense of 
conviction; (2) the offense to which a defendant is found guilty; 
or (3) the offense to which a defendant “pleaded guilty or nolo 
contendere.”40  Felony offenses are divided into levels of serious-
ness, ranging from one to ten.41  Level “I” represents the lowest 
level of seriousness, and “X” represents the highest.42  Notably, 
inchoate offenses are generally ranked one seriousness level be-
low the ranking of the underlying substantive offense.43  The hor-
izontal axis of the Sentencing Standards Grid represents an of-
fender’s criminal history score.44  Criminal history scores are 
computed based on prior felony or misdemeanor records, prior 
juvenile records (under certain circumstances), and “[c]ustod[ial] 
status at the time of the offense.”45  Section 16-90-803 allocates a 
specific weight, in points, to each of the criterion.46  The total 
number of points accrued by an offender determines their crimi-
nal history score.47  The intersection of the two axes on the Sen-
tencing Standards Grid—offense seriousness and criminal history 
score—determines the presumptive sentence of an offender.48  
Thus, as an individual’s criminal history score and offense seri-
ousness increase, so too does the “presumptive sentence” for that 
offender.49 
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(a)(2).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(1).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(1)(A).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(1)(A).
43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(1)(E).
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(2).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(2)(A).
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(2)(C).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(2).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(A)-(B).
49. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(A)-(B).
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Each cell of the Sentencing Standards Grid contains a pre-
sumptive sentence.50  This suggested punishment provides up to 
three options for the sentencing judge: (1) admission to the Ar-
kansas Department of Corrections (ADC); (2) admission to a 
Community Corrections Center (CCC); or (3) Alternative Sen-
tencing (AS).51  Some cells have only one or two recommended 
punishments, while other cells leave all options available.52  Ini-
tially, use of the Sentencing Standards Grid provided a single 
number for a presumptive sentence, and that number represented 
the suggested sentence, in months, at the ADC.53  But that process 
changed when the Council of State Government (CSG) conducted 
an eighteen-month study of Arkansas’s criminal justice system.54  
CSG’s study revealed “that 1,015 people in 2014 were sent to 
prison even though the [Sentencing Standards] grid suggested al-
ternative sentencing” or commission to a CCC.55  With Arkansas 
having “the third-fastest growing prison system in the nation,” 
deviations from the Sentencing Standards Grid only exacerbate 
the state’s pre-existing prison overpopulation problem.56  Com-
monplace sentencing discrepancies and prison overcrowding, 
among other factors, led CSG to propose changes to Arkansas’s 
criminal justice system.57  Many of these changes manifested 
themselves in Arkansas Act 423 of 2017, or “The Criminal Justice 
Efficiency and Safety Act.”58 
Notably, this Act changed the presumptive sentence from a 
single-month value to a range of months for each cell of the 
50. ASC, 2018 BENCHBOOK, supra note 36.
51. Id. at 3-4.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 1; see also infra Appendix B: Original Arkansas Sentencing Standards Grid.
54. Jacob Rosenberg, Arkansas Sentencing Changes, ARK. TIMES (June 29, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/DKB9-Z64T]. 
55. Id.
56. David Reutter, Overcrowding in Arkansas Prisons, Jails Spurs Call for Reforms,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (March 9, 2017), [https://perma.cc/Y4HF-WBHQ].  In August of 
2015, the ADC had 19,000 prisoners—”3,000 more than its manageable population limit.”  
“To help decrease the [ADC’s] population burdens, county jails began to take the state’s 
overflow prisoners.  Such measures, however, have resulted in jails filled to capacity or 
above. . . .  Statewide, there are around 2,700 prisoners awaiting transfer to an [ADC] facil-
ity.”  Id. 
57. See Rosenberg, supra note 54.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Sentencing Standards Grid containing sentences to the ADC.59  
Beginning January 1, 2018, this presumptive sentence range re-
placed the single-month duration found in the 1994-2017 Sen-
tencing Standards Grid.60  Unsurprisingly, every crime and of-
fender is different, and sentencing is not a one-size-fits-all 
approach.  A presumptive sentence with a single duration, how-
ever, attempts to make that approach work for every offender that 
falls within the same cell.  Alternatively, the range approach high-
lights the minimum and maximum suggested months for a judge 
to sentence between.61  This range approach will ideally provide 
the right amount of sentencing discretion and put an end to un-
substantiated deviations, thereby reducing sentencing discrepan-
cies and bringing the overall Sentencing Standards Grid further 
into compliance.62 
But determining the presumptive sentence is just that: pre-
sumptive.  Additional rules and factors are relevant.  For instance, 
if a presumptive sentence falls above or below the maximum or 
minimum statutory ranges, then the statutory range shall govern 
over the presumptive sentence.63  As stated in the Arkansas Sen-
tencing Commission’s Benchbook, “[t]he presumptive sentence 
is not intended to be the sentence in a particular case unless . . . 
the offense represents a typical case” based on the knowledge and 
experience of the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and/or the 
judge.64   
After the presumptive sentence is determined, the court next 
adjusts the punishment depending on aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  In the event of an atypical case,65  the Arkansas Code 
outlines the procedure for departing from a presumptive sen-
tence.66  Departures generally take two forms: durational and 
59. ASC, 2018 BENCHBOOK, supra note 36, at 1, 3; see also infra Appendix B.
60. ASC, 2018 BENCHBOOK, supra note 36, at 1, 3; see also infra Appendix A.
61. See infra Appendix A.
62. Rosenberg, supra note 54.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(C) (2017).
64. ASC, 2018 BENCHBOOK, supra note 36, at 1 (emphasis omitted in part).
65. An “atypical case” is a case that concerns aggravating and/or mitigating factors.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(a), (c) (2018). 
66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804.
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dispositional.67  “A durational departure occurs when the imposed 
months are higher or lower than the presumptive ADC [sen-
tence],” while “[a] dispositional departure occurs when the type 
of sanction [an offender receives] is not listed as an option for the 
presumptive sentence.”68  Departure from the presumptive sen-
tence may be justified when there are aggravating or mitigating 
factors at play.69  Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-804 
enumerates a nonexclusive list of factors that can be considered 
as a reason for departure from the presumptive sentence.70  Gen-
erally, mitigating factors lower the presumptive sentence while 
aggravating factors increase it.71  When departure from a pre-
sumptive sentence occurs, the court must list written reasons on 
the offender’s Sentencing Order.72  However, these written depar-
ture reasons are not required in probation revocation proceedings 
because the sentencing guidelines do not apply to these kinds of 
proceedings.73  Notably, Arkansas currently does not have an ap-
pellate review for offender-based challenges relating to sentenc-
ing guidelines.74 
After an offender’s sentence is determined, a Sentencing Or-
der75 must be filled out and sent to the correctional department 
where the offender will serve their punishment.76  Beginning Jan-
uary 1, 2012, Arkansas courts are required to use the Sentencing 
Order.77  The Sentencing Order “replaces and combines the for-
mer Judgment and Commitment, Judgment and Disposition, and 
Departure Report forms.”78  The purpose of the Sentencing Order 
“is to document the disposition of criminal cases processed in 
67. See FAQs, ARK. SENTENCING COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/45NG-UQ4R] [herein-
after ASC, FAQs]. 
68. Id.
69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804.
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(c)-(d).
71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(e)(9)(B), (d)(13)(B).
72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(a)(2)(A); see also infra Appendix C: Sentencing
Order. 
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803(a)(1)(B) (2017).
74. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 9 (2008), [https://perma.cc/G74H-
DZKH]. 
75. See infra Appendix C.
76. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-402 (2019); see also ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
78. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
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[Arkansas’s] circuit courts”, and to provide the “legal basis” for 
Arkansas prisons and jails, such as the ADC, to exercise “custody 
and community supervision [over] an offender.”79 
The Sentencing Order includes a section for each offense, 
with a listed sentencing option, to indicate the defendant’s sen-
tence.80  The listed sentencing options include Imposed, Proba-
tion, SIS, or Other.81  The Imposed option is used when an of-
fender is sentenced to a term of incarceration.82  Check boxes 
indicate whether and where incarceration will take place—in an 
ADC facility, a sentence to the ADC with a judicial transfer (Jud. 
Tran.) to the Arkansas Department of Community Correction 
(ACC), or a term of incarceration in a county jail—and also indi-
cate the number of months imposed.83  The Probation option is 
used when an offender is placed on probation, and SIS is chosen 
when the offender is placed on Suspended Imposition of Sentence 
(SIS), meaning that the offender is initially placed on probation, 
but upon violation of that probation the offender may be sen-
tenced to the full range of punishment for that particular crime for 
which they were convicted.84  Probation and SIS may be used in-
dependently or in conjunction with a term of incarceration on the 
Sentencing Order.85  If the SIS sentence includes a term of incar-
ceration (Probation/SIS Plus) then the length of incarceration is 
enumerated.86  The final option, “Other,” is “used when an of-
fender receives a sentence of Life, Life Without Parole (LWOP), 
or Death.”87  Aside from sentence-specific information, the Sen-
tencing Order also provides personal information about the of-
fender, information about the crime(s) committed, judge and 
court information, victim information, and departure information, 
among other details.88 
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also infra Appendix C.
81. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67; see also infra Appendix C.
82. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
83. Id.; see also infra Appendix C.
84. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67; Suspended Imposition of Sentence (SIS), USLEGAL,
[https://perma.cc/65PT-PTDJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
85. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also infra Appendix C.
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While the Sentencing Standards Grid makes alternative sen-
tencing available for more than half of its cells, probation and SIS 
are prohibited for certain crimes and cannot be used on the Sen-
tencing Order.89  Section 5-4-104(e)(1)(A) bars probation and SIS 
as to a term of imprisonment for the following offenses: (1) capi-
tal murder; (2) treason; (3) class Y felonies; (4) DWIs; (5) second 
degree murder; and (6) engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise.90  While class Y felonies are clearly ineligible for probation 
or SIS, “Act 192 of 1993 amended both [section 5-4-104(e)(1)(A) 
and section 5-4-301(a)(1)] to permit suspension and probation as 
alternative sentences for Class Y drug offenses.”91  Outside of 
these specifically enumerated exceptions, all appropriate punish-
ments are generally available for use on the Sentencing Order. 
Thus, before a judge pronounces a sentence, a number of 
steps occur.  Specifically, the judge: (1) determines offense seri-
ousness; (2) calculates the offender’s criminal history score; (3) 
determines the presumptive sentence by using the intersection of 
these two numbers on the Sentencing Standards Grid; (4) consid-
ers aggravating and mitigating factors that increase and decrease 
the presumptive sentence; (5) selects a sentence according to 
knowledge, experience, the facts of the case, and the presumptive 
sentence; and (6) completes a Sentencing Order reflecting the 
chosen punishment for the offender, and sends it to the appropri-
ate correctional department.92  Again, this entire procedure is 
wholly voluntary, but any departure from the presumptive sen-
tence must be documented, with reasons, in writing.93  Once the 
Sentencing Order is completed and sent to the requisite facility, 
criminal sentencing for an offender is finished.94 
Although it seems that judges are highly involved, prosecu-
tors also play a significant role in criminal sentencing.  Prior to 
the creation of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission and the Sen-
tencing Standards Grid, criminal sentences were the product of 
89. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(e)(1)(A) (2019); see also ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
91. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67; see also S.B. 40, 79th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
1993). 
92. See discussion supra Section I.B.
93. ASC, FAQs, supra note 67; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804 (2018).
94. See ASC, FAQs, supra note 67.
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both judicial and prosecutorial discretion.95  Prosecutors histori-
cally chose the charge, or charges, and the judge—based on that 
decision—sentenced within a broad statutory range.96  However, 
implementation of the Sentencing Standards Grid reduced judi-
cial discretion, yet left prosecutorial discretion undisturbed.97  
“The term ‘prosecutorial discretion’ refers to the fact that under 
American law, government prosecuting attorneys have nearly ab-
solute and unreviewable power to choose whether or not to bring 
criminal charges, and what charges to bring.”98  Ultimately, pros-
ecutors have two core discretionary choices: (1) the crimes 
charged; and (2) the plea agreements to enter.99  Although the 
prosecutor’s charging decision is subject to some limited con-
straints,100 a prosecutor’s decision to pursue a case is not re-
strained by any significant barriers. 
Depending on the structure of a prosecutor’s office, discre-
tion may reside solely with the head prosecuting attorney or may 
be distributed amongst all deputy prosecutors.101  Many prosecu-
tor offices have written policies to guide the charging decisions 
of individual deputy prosecutors.102  If these guidelines are vague, 
or only provide general guidance, then a considerable amount of 
discretion remains with each individual prosecutor.103  More 
stringent guidelines, however, shift discretionary charging deci-
sions from individual prosecutors to the head prosecuting attorney 
of a particular office.104 
The concept of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal jus-
tice system is not without its critics.  First, some argue that 
95. 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 364 (4th ed. 2006). 
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 113 (quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3
Encyclopedia of Crime & Justice 1246 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed., 2002)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted, and alteration adopted). 
99. Id. at 364.
100. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 95, at 114 (For example, prosecutors can
only initiate formal charges if they can “establish that there is probable cause to believe the 
defendant committed the crime.”  They cannot bring charges, however, for improper reasons, 
such as “racial bias[,] political persecution,” or for a vindictive purpose.). 
101. Id. at 116.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 116-17.
104. Id.
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prosecutors are not held to the constitutional norms required by 
our criminal justice system.105  For example, critics point both to 
the absence of rules governing prosecutorial charging decisions 
and to the absence of meaningful outside review of those same 
charging decisions.106  Prosecutorial discretion also raises equal 
protection concerns.107  One prominent critic has noted, “giving 
prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their dis-
cretion raises the prospect that society’s most fundamental sanc-
tions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the 
least favored members of the community—racial and ethnic mi-
norities, social outcasts, the poor—will be treated more 
harshly.”108  Finally, critics argue that prosecutors are not the ap-
propriate party to make charging decisions.109  Because prosecu-
tors undeniably advocate for a particular side in the criminal jus-
tice system, detractors assert that prosecutors lack the requisite 
neutrality to balance societal interests with charging decisions.110 
Superficially, criminal punishment in Arkansas seems to fol-
low a relatively straightforward Sentencing Standards Grid.  Fur-
ther examination, however, reveals numerous discretionary steps 
before an offender is sentenced, resulting in statewide punishment 
disparities.111  Before any sentencing decision even reaches a 
judge, the prosecutor must make a charging decision and deter-
mine the viability of any plea offer.112  The judge, supported by 
the prosecutor’s charges, then considers multiple factors for sen-
tencing: offense seriousness, criminal history score, and aggra-
vating and/or mitigating factors.113  Consequently, offender pun-
ishment is subject to discretionary decisions at numerous points 
of the sentencing process.  Although discretion is a necessary 
component of Arkansas’s criminal justice system, leaving it 
105. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 95, at 117.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 117-18.
108. Id. at 118 (quoting James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1554-55 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted, and alteration 
adopted). 
109. Id.
110. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 95, at 118.
111. See generally id. at 113-16, 199.
112. Id.
113. See infra Appendix C.
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unchecked could undermine the state’s criminal sentencing goal: 
proportional and equitable offender punishments statewide.114 
II. NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCES:
WASHINGTON V. SEBASTIAN COUNTY
To demonstrate the problem of sentencing disparities be-
tween Arkansas counties, this Comment examines the sentences 
for non-violent drug offenders in Washington and Sebastian 
County.115  In this study, non-violent drug offenders are defend-
ants who had at least one felony drug charge and no charges for 
crimes in which the offender used or threatened to use force upon 
a victim.116  Drug charges include any violation of law that pro-
hibited or regulated “the possession, use, distribution, or manu-
facture of illegal drugs.”117  To collect the relevant data, this Com-
ment relies on four weeks’ worth of Sentencing Orders from both 
Washington and Sebastian County.  In Arkansas, Sentencing Or-
ders are public record.118  This Comment separates non-violent 
114. Despite uniform state sentencing guidelines, criminal offenders in Arkansas re-
ceive dramatically different sentences depending on offender location.  The problem of sen-
tencing disparities between Arkansas counties is continuing to garner attention from prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, and judges across the state.  To substantiate the problem, this 
Comment conducts an empirical study of criminal sentencing in two Arkansas counties.  Alt-
hough the counties are geographically close, their sentencing is not.  Legal professionals 
practicing in Arkansas took specific notice of the vastly different sentences that defendants 
received in Sebastian County compared to Washington County and brought the issue to the 
author’s attention for evaluation.  To validate the claim, this Comment reviews a small subset 
of defendants—non-violent drug offenders.  This Comment selected non-violent drug of-
fenders for the empirical study for multiple reasons.  First, more sentencing orders existed 
for non-violent drug offender crimes than for other specific or more severe crimes and, thus, 
provided more data for the study.  Second, depending on the offense seriousness and the 
offender’s criminal history score, the Sentencing Standards Grid often provided for a pre-
sumptive sentence that had two or more forms of suggested punishment.  Accordingly, these 
types of crimes provided more sentencing discretion.  Finally, non-violent drug offenses do 
not implicate many of the aggravating and mitigating factors with the exception of two fre-
quently used factors.  In turn, this greatly reduces one externality potentially attributable to 
sentencing variations.  This Comment analyzes sentencing orders for seventy-nine non-vio-
lent-drug offenders, as more specifically defined in Part II.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 115-19. 
115. Alexis Stevens, Review of Washington and Sebastian County Sentencing Orders
(data on file with author) [hereinafter Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders]. 
116. Id.
117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-149286, FACT SHEET: DRUG-RELATED CRIME 1
(1994). 
118. See generally AOC PUBLIC COURTCONNECT, [https://perma.cc/YJ4L-JN2B]
(last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
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drug offenses from each set of Sentencing Orders and examines 
the sentence for each defendant.119  In addition to the final sen-
tence, this Comment collects data on criminal history scores, of-
fense seriousness, presumptive sentences, and departures. 
One defendant from the study, Travis Colt Hagar, received a 
severe sentence for three drug charges: Possession of Metham-
phetamine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Possession of 
Marijuana.120  The first two charges were classified as D felonies 
and the marijuana charge was classified as an A misdemeanor.121  
Hagar had a criminal history score of zero, and both felony 
charges carried an offense seriousness weight of three.122  Look-
ing to the Arkansas Sentencing Standards Grid, this means Ha-
gar’s presumptive sentence would have been a sentence to a CCC 
or an Alternative Sentence, such as probation or SIS.123  However, 
the Sebastian County Circuit Court sentenced Hagar to serve con-
current thirty-six-month terms in the ADC for the methampheta-
mine charge and the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, and 
a concurrent twelve-month term in the county jail for the posses-
sion of marijuana charge.124   
Collectively, Hagar was ultimately sentenced to serve three 
years in the ADC, with three years conditioned upon good behav-
ior, for three drug charges.125  The court justified its departure by 
citing aggravating factor number fourteen, “[m]ultiple concurrent 
sentences being entered at this time require a higher sentence.”126  
Of the Washington County Sentencing Orders, seven defendants 
shared two of Hagar’s felony charges.127  Of those seven defend-
ants, three had their charges dismissed or nolle prossed, three 
were placed on probation, and one received probation plus a 
119. For purposes of this study, only original sentences for a particular charge were
used.  The sentences do not include any probation, parole, or SIS revocations.  See Stevens, 
Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115. 
120. Sentencing Order, State v. Hagar, No. 66FCR-18-1173 (Oct. 24, 2018); see also
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-419(b)(1)(A) (2013), 5-64-443(a)(2) (2019), 5-64-419(b)(5)(A) 
(2013). 
121. Sentencing Order, Hagar, No. 66FCR-18-1173.
122. Id.
123. See infra Appendix A.
124. Sentencing Order, Hagar, No. 66FCR-18-1173.
125. Id.
126. See infra Appendix C.
127. Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115.
2020 SAME GRID, DIFFERENT RESULTS 197 
seventy-five-day period of confinement.128  Although all of the 
defendants received a lesser sentence than Hagar, three of them 
had a higher reported criminal history score, and two defendants 
had more charges.129 
Hagar’s case is not anomalous.  Clate Alan Leonard, a Se-
bastian County defendant, also received a class C felony, class D 
felony, and two A misdemeanor charges for: Possession of Meth-
amphetamine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Possession of 
Marijuana, and Possession of Clonazepam, respectively.130  Leon-
ard reflected a criminal history score of two, with offense serious-
ness ranging from three to four.131  For each felony charge Leon-
ard received forty-eight months in the ADC with seventy-two 
months SIS and forty-eight months in the ADC with twenty-four 
months SIS, respectively.132  The court sentenced Leonard to 
twelve months in the county jail for each misdemeanor charge.133  
Because the sentence was set to run concurrently and Leonard’s 
time at the ADC satisfied the county jail sentence, he was ulti-
mately sentenced to serve four years in the Department of Cor-
rections with six additional years conditioned upon good behav-
ior.134  Roughly translated, Leonard could spend as many as ten 
years in prison for just two felony drug charges.  Sebastian 
County justified its departure from the presumptive sentence for 
the possession of drug paraphernalia charge by relying on aggra-
vating factor fifteen, “[s]entence is higher as a result of other 
charges being dropped or merged.”135 
The problem of inconsistent sentencing practices persists in 
the context of habitual offenders, offenders already serving out 
some form of Alternative Sanction, or offenders with a high crim-
inal history score.  Take, for instance, Cameron Lamont Smith 
who was charged—while on SIS—with Delivery of Cocaine, 
Possession of Cocaine with Purpose to Deliver, and Possession of 
Marijuana with Purpose to Deliver, Class C, B, and C felonies, 
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Sentencing Order, State v. Leonard, No. 66FCR-18-981 (Oct. 5, 2018).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See infra Appendix C; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804 (2018).
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respectively.136  Because Smith’s criminal history score was 
ranked as a 5+ and the offense seriousness ranged from 4 to 6 for 
his crimes, his presumptive sentence suggested as long as 240 
months in prison.137  But Smith ultimately received 336 months, 
or 28 years, in prison for the 3 non-violent drug charges.138  
Defendants like Hagar, Leonard, and Smith merely illustrate 
Arkansas’s lack of uniform sentencing.  In just a four-week 
timespan, Sebastian County convicted twenty-two defendants on 
controlled substance charges alone.139  Of those twenty-two de-
fendants, seven received sentences that were upward durational 
or dispositional departures from the Sentencing Standards Grid, 
or thirty-two percent of the defendants.140  Only two of the de-
fendants that received departures were reportedly already on pro-
bation, parole, or SIS.141  Every Sebastian County departure was 
justified with aggravating factor number fourteen, “[m]ultiple 
concurrent sentences being entered at this time require a higher 
sentence,” or fifteen, “[s]entence is higher as a result of other 
charges being dropped or merged.”142  Between the twenty-two 
defendants, there were forty-seven felony drug charges in total, 
fourteen of which Sebastian County reported an upward departure 
on.143 This means that Sebastian County departed from the Sen-
tencing Standards Grid roughly thirty percent of the time in just a 
four-week period.144 
In the same four-week span, Washington County convicted 
fifty-seven defendants on felony controlled substances charges.145  
Only four of the fifty-seven defendants, or seven percent, re-
ceived upward departures from their presumptive sentences.146  
However, only one of the defendants that received the heightened 
136. Sentencing Order, State v. Smith, No. 66FCR-17-1579 & 66FCR-18-206A (Oct.
10, 2018). 
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Infra Appendix C (relying on authority provided by ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-
804 (2018)); see also Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115. 
143. Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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sentence was not reportedly under some kind of supervision, such 
as probation, parole, or SIS, when they committed the felo-
nies.****  In total, Washington County sentenced 123 felony 
drug charges with only 5 reported upward departures, meaning 
that Washington County only departed from the Sentencing 
Standards Grid in about 4 percent of charges compared to Sebas-
tian County’s 30 percent.147 
Unfortunately, departure frequency is not the only existing 
problem.  Sebastian County also sentenced more severely based 
on the offender’s presumptive sentence.  When all options were 
available—ADC, CCC, or AS—Sebastian County sentenced de-
fendants to a term of incarceration at the ADC fifty-eight percent 
of the time, a term of incarceration at a CCC facility in eight per-
cent of convictions, or Alternatively Sentenced the defendant 
thirty-three percent of the time.148  These sentences were dramat-
ically higher than Washington County, who—when all options 
were available—sentenced offenders to incarceration at an ADC 
facility in eleven percent of charges, incarceration at a CCC facil-
ity in thirty-four percent, and Alternative Sentencing in fifty-five 
percent.149  Similarly, out of all felony drug charges Sebastian 
County dismissed or nolle prossed the charges about nine percent 
of the time while Washington County dismissed or nolle prossed 
about twenty-two percent of controlled substance charges.150 
Although this case study only looks at controlled substance 
convictions with felony classifications over a four-week 
timeframe in two Arkansas counties, the problem is not that nar-
row.  Sentencing disparities involve all crimes, at all times, in all 
Arkansas counties.  It is not just a Washington County versus Se-
bastian County problem.  It is statewide.  The above-highlighted 
disparities only focus on narrow offender criterion during an in-
finitesimal conviction period.  If the study was pulled back to ex-
amine all criminal sentences across all Arkansas counties for 
more than a mere four weeks, how many offenders would we wit-
ness receiving dramatically different sentences depending on of-
fender location?   
147. Stevens, Review of Sentencing Orders, supra note 115.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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This is not a new phenomenon to Arkansas, but rather a 
problem that has yet to receive a viable solution.  With the fastest 
growing prison rate in the country,151 and overloaded probation 
and parole officers,152 the state’s criminal justice resources are al-
ready stretched thin.  Arkansas has responded by enlisting the 
help and suggestions of the CSG and implementing adjustments 
to the Sentencing Standards Grid.153  Yet, after employing the 
new presumptive sentence ranges, offenders still receive dramat-
ically different criminal sentences, and, once a sentence is entered 
for an offender, it is generally “game over.”  Defendants in Ar-
kansas can appeal a criminal conviction in its entirety, a process 
that is both costly, time consuming, and not practical for many 
criminal defendants, but there is currently no way to have a sen-
tence objectively reviewed.154  This means that all the discretion-
ary forces at play, such as prosecutor charging decisions, consist-
ently go unchecked.  The sentence received is the most important 
outcome for every defendant; it determines whether they will 
walk a free man or be stripped of their fundamental rights.  Thus 
far, Arkansas’s criminal sentencing has fallen short of its pro-
claimed goal—equitable sentencing statewide.  That is why it is 
time for Arkansas to try a new approach: a commission to review 
prosecutorial conduct. 
III. ADOPTION OF A STATE COMMISSION TO
REVIEW PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Criminal defendants in Arkansas have an absolute right to 
appeal their conviction within thirty days.155  Appeals, however, 
are often challenging given the costs and risks for certain defend-
ants.  For instance, a defendant seeking to appeal a conviction will 
have to pay additional attorney’s fees and court costs, and will 
151. Lindsey Millar, More Reminders of How Bad Arkansas’s Prison, Parole and Pro-
bation Systems Are, ARK. TIMES (June 22, 2016), [https://perma.cc/Q388-7W9C]. 
152. Id. (“Arkansas probation and parole officers average 129 cases per caseworker.”).
153. See discussion supra Section I.B.
154. See Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 413-14, 887 S.W.2d 275, 278 (1994) (explaining
that a court will not review a sentence for excessiveness when it is within the range pre-
scribed by statute for the charge); P. H. Vartanian, Annotation, Duty and Discretion of Dis-
trict or Prosecuting Attorney as Regards Prosecution for Criminal Offenses, 155 A.L.R. 10 
(1945) (“Prosecutors have broad discretion in charging decisions.”). 
155. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 1-2.
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also have to pay for a copy of the transcript from the lower 
court—except in certain limited circumstances.156  A defendant 
will not only continue to suffer a monetary burden if he or she 
chooses to appeal a conviction but may also expose themselves to 
additional risks in the process.  Although some appeals—such as 
an appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence—may come with lit-
tle or no danger, other appeals can result in a new trial for the 
defendant.157  In such instance, a defendant on appeal risks having 
an initial sentence replaced with a more severe sentence.158   
Direct appeals aside, a defendant may only reverse a judg-
ment by filing a Rule 37 Petition for Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel.159  A Rule 37 Petition claims that a trial attorney made 
errors in a defendant’s case which contributed to a difference in 
the defendant’s conviction.160  Given Arkansas defendants’ nar-
row options for appeal, sentencing disparities and departures may 
go unquestioned.  As a result, discretion also goes unchecked, al-
lowing potential abuses of prosecutorial discretion to become in-
consequential. 
Multiple states have become alarmed by the nonexistence of 
investigative bodies in response to growing concerns about pros-
ecutorial discretion.161  To remedy this issue, one state, New 
York, recently created a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct—
the first and only commission crafted to review claims of miscon-
duct by prosecutors.162*  Although Arkansas currently has a 
156. Lewis v. State, 279 Ark. 143, 145, 649 S.W.2d 188, 189 (1983) (per curium) (in-
digent criminal defendants may “perfect an appeal at public expense”). 
157. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.4.
158. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 50 (1973) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969)) (“[T]here exists no absolute constitutional bar to the imposition 
of a more severe sentence upon retrial . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
159. See generally ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1 (listing the grounds on which a defendant
may appeal a sentence). 
160. See ARK R. CRIM. P. 37.1; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 127 (2009). 
161. See, e.g., Joaquin Sapien et al., Who Polices Prosecutors Who Abuse Their Au-
thority? Usually Nobody, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 3, 2013), [https://perma.cc/NCX3-GTP7]. 
* At the time of writing this Comment, the afore cited New York statutes authorizing
the Commission’s oversight of New York prosecutors were unchallenged.  However, on Jan-
uary 28, 2020, the Supreme Court of Albany County, New York held these statutes to be 
unconstitutional, opining that the statutes impermissibly allocated jurisdiction from the Su-
preme Court Appellate Division, asked justices to render advisory opinions, and impinged 
on the governor’s constitutional jurisdiction to remove elected officials.  To constitutionally 
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committee that oversees judicial conduct,163 the state lacks any 
oversight of prosecutorial decisions.  To combat disparate crimi-
nal sentences and discretionary abuses, the Arkansas legislature 
should create a similar commission to supervise prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  The review panel would serve as a neutral, third-party 
commission to hear and investigate grievances about prosecuto-
rial misconduct.  The commission would provide criminal de-
fendants with a broader outlet to address sentencing disparities 
while avoiding the risks and costs of appeal and would promote 
the Arkansas Sentencing Standards Grid’s intended purpose—eq-
uitable sentencing statewide.  Accordingly, Arkansas should 
adopt a state-specific version of the New York Commission on 
Prosecutorial Conduct (the Commission), which follows in detail. 
Eleven members make up the Commission: one “full time 
law professor or dean at an accredited law school with significant 
criminal law experience”; two retired judges—one with “signifi-
cant work experience providing public defense services and one 
[with] significant prosecutorial experience”164; four attorneys that 
have provided “public defense services” for five or more years; 
and four “active, former[,] or retired prosecutors with at least five 
years of prosecutorial experience.”165  Aside from initial 
operate in Arkansas, the Commission should be created and governed by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court in adherence with Arkansas’s constitution. 
162. S.B. S2412D, 2017-2018 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (codified at N.Y.
JUD. LAW §§ 499-a to -j (2019)); Jesse McKinley, A New Panel Can Investigate Prosecutors. 
They Plan to Sue to Block It., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/JW84-RS5S]; 
Jan Ransom & Ashley Southall, Prosecutors Sometimes Behave Badly. Now They May Be 
Held to Account., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), [https://perma.cc/LHT2-CB2H]. 
163. See JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/C4P6-
JQ6Q] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019) (“The Commission investigates and may take disciplinary 
action or, in the most serious cases, recommend to the Arkansas Supreme Court that it im-
pose discipline upon a judge whose actions are found to be a violation of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.”). 
164. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(b) (McKinney 2019).  The chief judge of the New
York Court of Appeals appoints the law professor or dean and the retired judges.  Id.  A 
“retired judge” means “a former judge or justice of the unified court system who was quali-
fied as an attorney during such service and served as such a judge or justice for at least five 
years.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-b(6) (McKinney 2019). 
165. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(a).  The governor of New York appoints two prosecu-
tors and two public defenders to the Commission.  Id.  New York legislative leaders appoint 
the remaining two prosecutors and two public defenders.  Id. at (1)(c).  Specifically, the 
temporary president of the senate, the minority leader of the senate, the speaker of the as-
sembly, and the minority leader of the assembly each recommend one member.  Id. 
2020 SAME GRID, DIFFERENT RESULTS 203 
appointments, each Commission member is appointed for a four-
year term.166  Once nominated, the Commission members choose 
one member to serve as the Commission Chairperson.167 
Upon the filing of a complaint, the Commission has the au-
thority to review prosecutorial conduct to determine whether the 
conduct as alleged violates applicable rules and/or law.168  De-
parture as to any applicable statute, case law, or New York Rule 
of Professional Conduct169 sufficiently forms the basis for a com-
plaint.170  The Commission can then initiate, investigate, and hear 
complaints regarding the conduct, qualifications, fitness to per-
form, or performance of official duties of any prosecutor.171  
Complaints must be in writing and signed by the complainant.172  
Once the Commission receives the complaint, they: (1) investi-
gate the complaint; or (2) dismiss the complaint if it lacks 
merit.173  If the Commission dismisses the complaint, it then no-
tifies the complainant and, if initially notified about the 
166. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(c)(3).  Commission membership does not constitute
the holding of public office and an oath of office is not required for admission.  Id. at 
(1)(c)(2).  Further, members do not receive any form of compensation for serving on the 
Commission.  Id.at (1)(c)(5).  However, each member is entitled to reimbursement of any 
“actual and necessary expenses incurred in the discharge of his or her duties” to the Com-
mission.  Id.  The Commission’s business persists even when, “pending new appoint-
ments[,]” a “temporary imbalance in the number of prosecutors and defense attorneys” oc-
curs.  Id. at (1)(c).  Notably, membership ceases “if a member attains a position which would 
have rendered him or her ineligible for appointment at the time of his or her appointment.”  
Id. at (1)(c)(3).  Additionally, the original appointing authority may replace any member for 
the remainder of their term if they fail to participate for ninety days.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-
c(1)(c)(2). 
167. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(c)(2).  The Chairperson serves for the shorter of: (1)
their remaining term of office; or (2) two years.  Id.  See also discussion supra Part III (Chair-
person’s functions). 
168. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-a (McKinney 2019).
169. Including particular emphasis on the special responsibilities of a prosecutor.  In
Arkansas’s case, see Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8. 
170. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1) (McKinney 2019).
171. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).  “‘Prosecutor’ means a district attorney or any assistant
district attorney of any [New York] county . . . in an action to exact any criminal penalty, 
fine, sanction, or forfeiture.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-b(2) (McKinney 2019). 
172. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).  In some circumstances, the Commission requires a
verified complaint.  Id. 
173. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).  For any action requiring a Commission decision eight
members “constitute a quorum . . . and the concurrence of six members . . . [is] necessary.” 
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(c)(6) (McKinney 2019). 
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complaint, the prosecutor.174  The Commission can also initiate 
an investigation of a prosecutor on its own accord.175   
If a prosecutor is a Commission member and is the subject 
of a complaint or investigation, they are “disqualified from par-
ticipating in any [of the] proceedings with respect thereto.”176  
Additionally, if any Commission member is employed in the 
same organization as the subject, they too are disqualified from 
participating in the subsequent proceedings.177  During an active 
criminal investigation, the prosecuting agency may inform the 
Commission “of its position that the [C]ommission’s investiga-
tions will substantially interfere with the agency’s own criminal 
investigation.”178  If the prosecuting agency articulates its basis 
with specificity and particularity, then the Commission only ex-
ercises its powers in a manner that does not interfere with the on-
going investigation or prosecution.179 
If the Commission requires the prosecutor’s appearance dur-
ing an investigation, the Commission notifies180 the prosecutor, 
in writing, of their request and attaches a copy of the complaint.181  
If, during investigation, the Commission determines that a hear-
ing182 is warranted, they must draft and serve a formal written 
complaint, signed and verified by the Administrator, on the 
174. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).
175. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(2).  In such event, the Commission files a written com-
plaint, signed by the Administrator, to serve as the basis for the investigation.  Id.  See supra 
notes 230-32 and accompanying text (Administrators). 
176. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(c)(4).  An individual is considered a subject if the com-
plaint or investigation concerns the individual’s “qualifications, conduct, fitness to perform, 
or performance of his or her official duties.”  Id. 
177. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(1)(c)(4).
178. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(1) (McKinney 2019).  The Commission prescribes the
form and manner in which a prosecuting agency informs it of such position.  Id. 
179. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(1).  Additionally, the Commission refrains from exercis-
ing its powers before the earlier of: (1) “the filing of an accusatory instrument” regarding the 
crimes leading to the investigation and underlying the complaint; or (2) “one year from the 
commencement of the occurrence of” the crimes leading to the investigation and underlying 
the complaint.  Id. 
180. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(3).  The Commission gives notice either: (1) “personally,
at least three days prior to such appearance”; or (2) “by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested, at least five days prior to such appearance.”  Id. 
181. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(3).
182. A “hearing” is any proceeding which addresses complaints, investigations, hear-
ings, and dispositions, in accordance with the Commission’s rules and provisions.  N.Y. Jᴜᴅ. 
Lᴀᴡ § 499-f(4). 
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prosecutor.183  Thereafter, the prosecutor “file[s] a written answer 
. . . with the [C]ommission within twenty days.”184  Next, if the 
Commission determines that a hearing is still warranted, it noti-
fies the prosecutor in writing “either personally, at least twenty 
days [before the hearing], or by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested, at least twenty-two days prior.”185  The Commission ad-
ditionally notifies complainants of hearings.186  However, unless 
the prosecutor subpoenas the complainant as a witness, their at-
tendance is within the Commission’s discretion.187  Additionally, 
hearings are not public unless the prosecutor demands a public 
hearing in writing.188 
During the hearing, the Commission may take witness testi-
mony and receive evidence and material relevant to the com-
plaint.189  The prosecutor has a right to representation by counsel 
during the hearing, to call and cross-examine witnesses, and to 
present evidence and other relevant material.190  The Commission 
takes a transcript of the entire hearing for their records.191  “Sub-
ject to the [Commission’s approval], the [A]dministrator and the 
prosecutor may agree on a statement of facts and may stipulate in 
183. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).  The complaint must also be accompanied with notice.
Id. 
184. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).
185. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).  The prosecutor may make a written request for “all
documents which the [C]ommission intends to present at such hearing and any written state-
ments made by witnesses who will be called to give testimony by the [C]ommisson.”  Id.  In 
such event, the Commission must, at no cost to the prosecutor, provide copies of the re-
quested documents and statements five days before the hearing.  Id.  Absent a written request, 
the Commission must still make any relevant exculpatory evidence and material available to 
the prosecutor five days prior to the hearing.  Id.  However, the Commission’s failure “to 
timely furnish any documents, statements[,] and/or exculpatory eviden[ce] . . . [does] not 
affect the validity of any proceedings provided that such failure is . . . substantially prejudi-
cial to the prosecutor.”  Id. 
186. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).
187. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).
188. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).
189. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).
190. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).  Notably, prosecutors have a right to representation by
counsel during all investigation stages where the Commission requires the prosecutor’s ap-
pearance to present relevant evidence and material for the complaint.  Id. 
191. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).  The Commission creates a transcript for all proceed-
ings where testimony or statements under oath are taken.  Id.  The Commission makes avail-
able to the prosecutor a transcript of their testimony without cost.  Id.  The Commission 
keeps transcripts confidential, except as otherwise permitted.  Id. 
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writing” a waiver of the hearing.192  Upon such waiver, the Com-
mission uses the “pleadings and agreed statement of facts” to 
make a finding.193 
Following the hearing, the Commission may find it neces-
sary to “admonish or censure” a prosecutor or to recommend re-
moval194 of the prosecutor “from office for cause” to the gover-
nor.195  A prosecutor can either accept the Commission’s 
determination or request review by the presiding justices of the 
appellate division.196  However, if the prosecutor accepts the 
Commission’s punishment, then the Commission carries out the 
punishment according to its findings.197  Alternatively, a 
192. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(5).
193. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(5).
194. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7).  Removal or retirement of a prosecutor is considered
a removal from public office pursuant to section thirty of the New York Public Officers Law. 
See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 30 (McKinney 2018).  If a prosecutor resigns pursuant to any 
recommendation of removal, or pending a determination of removal, jurisdiction remains 
unaffected.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-i (McKinney 2019).  Thus, the Commission and the pre-
siding justices of the appellate division have continuing jurisdiction over the matter.  Id.  See 
supra note 198 (defining “presiding justices of the appellate division”). 
195. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).  For cause includes, but is not limited to, “misconduct
in office, as evidenced by [a prosecutor’s] departure from his or her obligations under appro-
priate statute, case law, and/or New York Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Id.  Additionally, 
for cause includes “persistent failure to perform his or her duties, conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,” or necessary retirement due to “mental or physical disability pre-
venting the proper performance of his or her prosecutorial duties.”  Id.  If, following a hear-
ing, the Commission makes such determination, then the Commission sends it to the presid-
ing justices of the appellate division.  Id.  See supra note 198 (defining “presiding justices of 
the appellate division”).  The written determination also includes the Commission’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the record of the proceedings that the determination is 
based on.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(1).  The presiding justices of the appellate division then 
propound a copy of the same to the prosecutor involved, either personally or by mail.  Id.  
Once service is complete, the Commission’s determination, its findings and conclusions, and 
the “record of its proceedings [are] made available” to the public at the Commission’s “prin-
cipal office . . . and at the office of the clerk of the appellate division in the department in 
which the alleged misconduct occurred.”  Id.  However, the Commission does not disclose 
records provided by a prosecuting agency to the Commission.  Id.  See also N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW art. VI, §§ 84-90. 
196. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7).  The prosecutor must make the request for review in
writing within thirty days of receipt of the determination.  Id.  “Presiding justices of the 
appellate division” means “collectively, the presiding justices of the appellate division of the 
supreme court of each judicial department.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-b(5) (McKinney 2019) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The chief administrative judge establishes filing and 
communication procedures for those interacting with the presiding justice of the appellate 
division pursuant to this Commission.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(5) (McKinney 2019). 
197. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7).  If the prosecutor accepts the Commission’s determi-
nation of removal or retirement, then the presiding justices of the appellate division transmit 
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prosecutor may request a review of the determination.198  In that 
case, the presiding justices of the appellate division review the 
Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law based on 
the proceedings’ record.199  After review, the presiding justices of 
the appellate division: (1) accept or reject the determined sanc-
tion; (2) impose a different sanction, including admonition or cen-
sure, or recommended removal or retirement; or (3) impose no 
sanction.200  The presiding justices of the appellate division also 
have the power to suspend a prosecutor pending the Commis-
sion’s determination of retirement or removal.201  Further, both 
the presiding justices of the appellate division and the Commis-
sion can suspend a prosecutor charged with a felony.202  The 
Commission may—at any time—determine that no further action 
is necessary after service of a formal complaint, during a hearing, 
or following a hearing.203  In such event, the Commission dis-
misses the complaint and notifies both the complainant and pros-
ecutor in writing.204   
The Commission protects certain records as confidential: 
“complaints, correspondence, . . . proceedings[,] transcripts[, 
and] other papers[,] data[,] and records.”205  Information is only 
the Commission’s findings to the governor.  Id.  The governor then independently determines 
whether to retire or remove the prosecutor.  Id.  Any determination by the governor to remove 
a prosecutor from office who has already resigned still renders the prosecutor ineligible to 
hold any other prosecutorial office.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-j(2) (McKinney 2019). 
198. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7).
199. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(8).
200. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(8).  The presiding justices of the appellate division may
only recommend removal or retirement based on the previously listed for-cause reasons.  See 
infra note 196 (for cause).  If the presiding justices recommend removal or retirement, they 
and the Commission shall transmit the entire record to the governor.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-
f(8).  The governor again independently determines whether retirement or removal of the 
prosecutor is appropriate.  Id. 
201. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f.  Suspension terminates upon conviction also resulting in
the prosecutor’s disbarment.  Id.  If the conviction becomes final, the prosecutor is removed 
from office.  Id.  Suspension also terminates upon reversal of the conviction and dismissal 
of the accusatory instrument.  Id.  Unless the presiding justices of the appellate division direct 
otherwise, a prosecutor suspended from office by the court receives their salary during the 
suspension period.  Id. 
202. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(9)(a).  The Commission additionally has authority to sus-
pend prosecutors charged with any crime involving moral turpitude.  Id. 
203. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(6).
204. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(6).
205. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-g (McKinney 2019).
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released following a determination by the Commission206 or fol-
lowing a written request from the subject prosecutor.207  The 
Commission may reprimand, fine, suspend, or remove “[a]ny 
staff member, employee[,] or agent” that breaches confidential-
ity.208  Within ten days of acquiring knowledge of the breach, the 
Chairperson files written charges against the breaching individ-
ual.209  Within five days of filing the written charges, all members 
of the Commission must vote whether probable cause for the 
charges exists.210  If probable cause exists, the Commission, 
within five days of the vote, sends the accused a written statement 
specifying the charges in detail and outlining the accused’s 
rights.211  Within ten days of receipt, the accused can: (1) request 
a hearing on the charges212; or (2) waive the hearing.213 
The Commission has the authority to establish rules and pro-
cedures for hearings.214  However, the rules need not comply with 
the technical rules of the New York Rules of Evidence or the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.215  Prior to the hearing, the Commission 
selects a panel to oversee the proceeding.216  The panel chooses 
206. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(7).
207. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-f(4).  The prosecutor may request for the Commission to
make the records public or be made available to any person, agency, or individual designated 
by the prosecutor.  Id. 
208. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(1) (McKinney 2019).
209. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(2).  The Commission can suspend the accused’s pay
pending final determination of the charges.  Id. 
210. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(2).
211. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(2).
212. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(2).  If the accused requests a hearing the Commission
schedules such hearing at its offices within twenty days and immediately notifies the accused 
of the place and time in writing.  Id. at (3).  During the proceedings, the accused has the 
opportunity to defend themselves and testify on their own behalf.  Id.  They also have the 
right to representation “by counsel, to subpoena witnesses[,] and to cross-examine wit-
nesses.”  Id. at (4).  All testimony at the proceeding is taken under oath and a record of the 
proceedings kept.  Id.  Upon written request, the accused may obtain a copy of the record at 
no charge.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(4). 
213. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(2).  If the accused fails to notify the Commission within
ten days, they waive their rights to a hearing.  Id.  If waiver occurs, the Commission decides 
within ten days by a majority vote what the accused’s charges will be and the penalty or 
punishment for such charges.  Id. 
214. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(4).
215. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(4).
216. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(4).  Panels are comprised of three Commission members,
one of which must be a member of the bar.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-e(1) (McKinney 2019). 
“‘Member of the bar’ means a person admitted to the practice of law in [New York] for at 
least five years.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-b(4) (McKinney 2019).  “The [C]ommission may 
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one person to act as the Chairperson, who conducts the hearing.217  
Within five days of the hearing’s conclusion, the panel sends a 
report of the hearing to the Commission and the accused.218  The 
report details the panel’s findings, recommendations, and penalty 
or punishment, if warranted.219  The Commission then determines 
whether to implement the panel’s recommendation.220  However, 
if the Commission dismisses the charges, then it restores the ac-
cused to their position with full pay and expunges the charges 
from their record.221 
The Commission also has an array of powers and duties nec-
essary to carry out its functions.  First, the Commission is em-
powered to: “conduct hearings and investigations[;] administer 
oaths or affirmations[;] subpoena witnesses[;] compel [witness] 
attendance[;] examine [witnesses] under oath or affirmation[;] 
and require the production of any books, records, documents[,] or 
other evidence that it may deem relevant or material to an inves-
tigation.”222  Additionally, the Commission has both the power 
and duty “[t]o adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and 
procedures” incumbent on executing the Commission’s 
delegate any of its functions, powers[,] and duties to a [P]anel” except in the case of “con-
fer[ring] immunity in accordance with section 50.20 of the [New York] criminal procedure 
law.”  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-e(1); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.20.  Additionally, 
Panels cannot take any action with respect to Referees.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-e(1).  In the 
event of three-member Panels, two members constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of 
two Panel members is necessary for any action taken.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(6) (McKinney 
2019). 
217. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(4).
218. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(5).
219. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(5).
220. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(5).  The Commission determines whether it will accept
the recommendation within ten days of receipt and implements such recommendation within 
five days of that determination.  Id. 
221. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-h(5).  Full pay also includes any period of suspension with-
out pay.  Id. 
222. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(1) (McKinney 2019).  The Commission can appoint any
Commission or staff member to exercise any of the enumerated powers, excluding, however, 
the ability “to subpoena witnesses or require the production of books, records, documents[,] 
or other evidence” which is reserved solely for a member of the Commission or the Admin-
istrator.  Id.  The Commission is also empowered to bestow immunity when, in the Commis-
sion’s opinion, such is “necessary and proper in accordance with section 50.20 of [New 
York’s] criminal procedure law.”  Id. at (2); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.20 
(McKinney 2019).  However, the Commission must give the attorney general and the appro-
priate district attorney at least forty-eight hour written notice that it intends to confer such 
immunity.  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(2). 
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objectives and all subparts of the New York Commission on Pros-
ecutorial Conduct.223  Third, the Commission has the power to 
demand any “assistance, information[,] and data” that facilitates 
execution of “its functions, powers[,] and duties.”224  The Com-
mission may make these requests from “any court, department, 
division, board, bureau, commission, or other agency of [New 
York] or political subdivision thereof or any public authority.”225 
The Commission has the duty to conform to annual reporting 
requirements.226  The Commission sends the required information 
to the governor, the legislature, and the chief judge of the New 
York Court of Appeals and reports the proceedings upon which 
they have made a final determination.227  The Commission can 
also make certain appointments to carry out its functions and du-
ties.228  Specifically, the Commission may appoint or remove an 
Administrator at their discretion.229  The Administrator appoints 
any such “deputies, assistants, counsel, investigators[,] and other 
officers and employees” that they deem necessary.230  Further, the 
Administrator prescribes their powers and duties, fixes their com-
pensation, and reimburses their expenses within the appropriated 
amounts.231  Second, the Commission may designate a Referee to 
hear and report to them.232  In that instance, a Referee is author-
ized to: “conduct hearings[;] administer oaths or affirmations[;] 
subpoena witnesses[;] compel [witness] attendance[;] examine 
[witnesses] under oath or affirmation[;] and require the 
223. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(5).  The Commission cannot make changes inconsistent
with the law.  Id.  The Commission files any such rule or procedure in the offices of the chief 
administrator of the courts and the secretary of state.  Id. 
224. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(3).
225. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(3).
226. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(4).  The Commission may require additional reporting as
deemed necessary.  Id. 
227. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-d(4).  The contents can make “legislative and administrative
recommendations” however, any report—including the annual report—and the contents in-
cluded therein must satisfy the Commission’s confidentiality provisions.  Id. 
228. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(7) (McKinney 2019).
229. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(7).  The Administrator must be a “Member of the bar”
that does not hold and has never held a prosecutorial position prosecutor.  Id.  See also supra 
note 217 (defining “Member of the bar”). 
230. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(7).
231. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-c(7).
232. Referees may be any member of the bar that is not a prosecutor or member of the
Commission or its staff.  N.Y. Jud. Law § 499-e(2).  A Referee carries out their duties in 
accordance with the rules and provisions set forth by the Commission.  Id. 
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production of any books, records, documents[,] or other evidence 
that the [R]eferee . . . deem[s] relevant or material to the subject 
of the hearing.”233  Notably, none of the powers, duties, and func-
tion of the Commission supersede those of the governor.234 
IV. CONCLUSION
State-wide uniform sentencing guidelines fall short of their 
proclaimed purpose: uniform sentencing.235  Disparate sentencing 
remains an issue for many criminal defendants in Arkansas.  In a 
study of Washington and Sebastian county, sentencing orders 
have shown that non-violent drug offenders receive a harsher 
punishment depending on offender location alone.  Despite the 
implementation of numerous safeguards, however, prosecutorial 
discretion has remained in-tact.  Given that prosecutors occupy 
one of the most critical roles in our justice system, it is counterin-
tuitive to allow such power to go unchecked.  Because defendants 
are relegated to limited options for appealing their sentence or 
bringing prosecutorial grievances to light, Arkansas should im-
plement a commission to review prosecutorial conduct similar to 
the New York Commission.  The Arkansas commission would 
provide a formal outlet and procedure for complainants to have 
their grievances fairly addressed by a neutral third-party.  Not 
only would an Arkansas commission redress the wrongs commit-
ted at the prosecutor level, but it would also deter future prosecu-
torial misconduct.  While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to 
disparate sentencing, a state commission to review prosecutorial 
conduct would tip the scales closer to uniformity and justice for 
all. 
233. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-e(2).
234. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 499-j(1).
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801(b) (2019).
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